What can a sociologist
say that hasn't been said many times about the Hamas raid and Israel's retaliatory
war in Gaza? I will draw on theoretical
generalizations from the history and time-dynamics of violence (Mann 2023;
Collins 2022); as applied to a daily chronology of news sources from Oct. 7, 2023 onwards. I will make 3 points.
[1] Hamas's violent
incursion, killing and raping civilians and taking hostages, is a reversion to
ancient and medieval forms of war. It is a conscious rejection of modern laws
and norms. It is also a tactic to compensate for Israel's overwhelming
advantage in state capacity and military power.
[2] The sequence of
events fits the pattern of polarization found in all large-scale conflicts:
emotions and beliefs go to extremes. All virtues are on our side; all evil
qualities are on the other. Each side
sees the other as the epitome of evil, and themselves as innocent victims. This
moral gulf justifies both sides in carrying out extreme acts against the other.
[3] Time-dynamics are patterns in the intensity
of mobilization over a period of time. When a large-scale conflict breaks out,
excitement spreads very rapidly in the first few days. Expressions of emotional
and moral polarization are at their peak in the first weeks. Mobilization stays
at a plateau for about 3 months; by 6 months part of the group loses their
militancy, and begins to seek a truce or end the conflict; while another
faction presses on for their righteous drive to victory. To conflict with the
enemy is added conflict between "hawks" and "doves". This
time pattern was studied in the period followed the 9/11/01 attacks, and with
historical data on public behavior and opinion after the outbreaks of war, from
World War One through the recent past (Collins 2004; 2022). Time-dynamics
enables us to predict in some degree what will happen in the future.
Deliberate revival of pre-modern cultural traditions of violence
Raiding was the
predominant style of war in tribal societies-- i.e. temporary coalitions of
warriors; in contrast to state-organized societies with a permanent government
and professional armies. A raid does not attempt to take enemy territory but
just temporarily cause havoc in it. Tribal coalitions had an informal leader-and-follower
pattern on the battlefield. War between adjacent tribes usually took the form of
loose battle lines, with individuals darting forward to shoot arrows or spears
and then running back. Such confrontations were usually indecisive. Most
casualties were caused by raiding the other's territory, especially by stealth,
and killing any isolated victim-- a child or woman from the enemy tribe was
considered a victory and was celebrated.
A more sophisticated
version of raiding was capturing enemy warriors; sometimes taken as slaves. The
Aztecs of central Mexico fought to capture warriors to sacrifice on their
ceremonial pyramid; this served both as an impressive religious ritual, and to
terrify neighbouring tribes into submission.
Tribes with herding animals raided to capture the cattle or horses of
their enemies. When European settlers spread across the Americas, hostilities
were often triggered by native tribes raiding their livestock, leading to the
whites retaliating with modern fire-power.
Medieval armies,
whether fighting within Europe, or in the Crusades to Palestine and Syria, were
typically bands of mounted knights. In the shifting stalemates that often
ensued, they would concentrate on capturing hostages, who could then be traded
either for ransom or in a prisoner exchange. When armies of the Roman phalanx
type encountered tribal armies in North Africa, the latter used the tactic of a
noisy attack, then suddenly running away, setting up an ambush as their
pursuers became strung out and lost their formation. Middle Eastern armies had
an historical tradition of hit-and-run raids. The Arab army mustered by T.E.
Lawrence in World War One raided Ottoman railroad lines, combining camels for
mobility with modern explosives. There was a long tradition of taking captives,
either as slaves (the Mameluke army of Egypt was itself recruited from boys
captured as slaves), or as hostages for
exchange. Arabs were the principal slave traders, intermediaries between
sub-Saharan Africa and slave markets elsewhere.
With the development of
modern customs and laws of war in Europe, such practices were gradually
stigmatized and outlawed. Hostage taking became kidnapping-- one of the capital
offenses along with murder. Capturing for ransom has become heinous, as is
trafficking sex-slaves. Distinctions became drawn between civilians and
military; deliberate violence against civilians becomes a major crime akin to
genocide.
The Hamas raid into
Israel was designed to capture hostages to trade for the release of Hamas prisoners
held in Israel. One could call it a deliberate atavism; but it is also hyper-modern
in the sense that it is a calculation as to what tactics would work against a
militarily dominant state. Israel had proven itself unmoved by modern tactics
of mass demonstrations, terrorist bombings, and guerilla war; reacting by
bulldozing family homes of terrorists and destroying hiding places among the
civilian population. But experience in recent years showed the Israelis were
willing to release a large number of prisoners in exchange for a few or even
one hostage. Hostage taking was one tactic that worked.
It also fits with the
moral stance of militant Muslim groups. Western society is represented in
cartoons and propaganda as immoral and decadent; its sex life as pornographic;
its women as dissolute, compared to the purity ideal of covered-up Muslim
women. The biggest target of the October 7 raid was an all-night drug concert,
Western-style music with ecstasy and psychedelics, held in the desert near the
Gaza border. It was simultaneously an easy target -- a bunch of stoned
druggies-- and a display of what conservative Muslim culture considered
disgraceful. The concert was the site of numerous rapes, stripping women naked,
killing them or taking them prisoner. Intercepted messages of excited
congratulation from the families of the rapists show the righteous attitude of
the traditionalists; comparable to Biblical rejoicing in the destruction of
Sodom and Gomorrah. This is not just anti-modernism; it is moral condemnation
of modernity.
We may add one more
point on tactics. Throughout the spring and summer of 2023, a political crisis
built up in Israel, concerning the power of the Supreme Court to over-rule
decisions made by the legislature. With a coalition of conservatives holding a
narrow majority, liberal parties mobilized impassioned demonstrations, in an
atmosphere widely regarded as a constitutional crisis. Large segments of the
Israeli military joined the opposition; there was wild talk of civil war. Hamas
leaders, close observers of their enemy, saw an ideal opportunity for their
hostage-taking raid. Political controversy in Israel following October 7 has
faulted the government for failure of vigilance. But a sociological explanation
of the intelligence failure must include the distraction of attention,
including within the armed forces and intelligence agencies, when the focus was
on the constitutional crisis.
Religious and other
forms of traditional moralities and practices can coexist with strategic caculations.
Technologies of war have always been the quickest to diffuse to traditional
societies. There is no anomaly in Hamas using drones, gliders and bulldozers to
mount a tribalistic raid aimed at civilians of all ages and sexes, practicing
both ritual humiliation and strategic hostage-taking. The combination of modern
rationality and anti-modern traditionalism is no sociological contradiction.
Polarization of righteous outrage on both sides
The October 7 raid was
viewed with shock and outrage not only in Israel-- where the Supreme Court
crisis was quickly dropped and an all-parties war cabinet formed-- but
world-wide. On the other side, sympathy for Palestinian grievances has grown
since the Intifada protests in the 1990s, which although a failure in Israel,
attracted attention of the outside world. Sympathy existed not only in the
Muslim world, but in Europe and among left-wing and immigrant groups. In the
USA, which contains the largest Jewish population outside Israel, politicians
and journalists reacted vehemently to pro-Palestianian statements and
demonstrations, accusing liberal university administrators of shielding
anti-semitism. Although the media were largely on the Israeli side, public
ambivalence increased when Israel
invaded Gaza, with devastating use of modern air power, causing outrage
among Palestinian sympathizers and qualms among neutrals.
The war quickly became
a contest of rival public relations campaigns. Israel at first attempted to
keep the focus on the victims of the raid, especially civilian atrocities upon
children and women (with less attention to the number of Israeli soldiers also
taken captive). Over time this was upstaged by news coming out of Gaza, a
mounting toll of deaths, estimated at comprising two-thirds women and children.
Israel attempted to keep control over news sources, allowing only selected
reporters to cover the scenes it wanted to publicize, notably the underground
tunnels; soft-spoken military spokespersons explained on television that
Israel's response was moderate, precision-planned, doing everything possible to
protect Palestianian civilians. Meanwhile, photos from Gaza showed buildings
flattened like the worst of WWII, and on television people digging bodies out
of the rubble with their bare hands. As Israeli forces moved southward,
virtually the entire population was forced to crowd into a shrinking space.
Israeli warnings to evacuate came across as propaganda, giving little practical
opportunity to escape, and nowhere safe from aerial attacks.
Although perhaps
sincerely meant by some Israeli officials, precautions to protect civilians
were advisory only and could be overruled by military contingencies. The
concept of "precision weapons" is itself euphemistic; the fog of war
still exists, even with advanced electronics and surveillance. An instance is
the scandal when several hostages escaping in the war zone were killed by
Israeli troops, who thought they were a Hamas ruse for an ambush; even when the
hostages called out in Hebrew, some of the soldiers did not hear the order to
hold fire, in the noise of combat. Unintended strikes on civilians continue to
happen in high-tech war, especially when it consists of long distance air
strikes plus dispersed infantry operations in the maze of urban warfare. And
some strikes are intended, willing to inflict civilian casualties if they provide
cover for militant hide-outs. Although numbers are always suspect under these
conditions, the 1200 Israelis killed in the Oct. 7 raid have been steadily
drowned out in the rising level of Palestian casualties, surpassing 30,000 at
time of writing. To counter this perception, Israeli public relations
periodically released more graphic depictions of the original Oct. 7 atrocities
and the experiences of hostages released in prisoner trades.
Since late October
2023, Palestianians and international aid organizations have described a
desperate situation throughout Gaza-- running out of water, sanitation, medical
supplies, and food. By all appearances the situation was dire-- almost everyone's
home destroyed, the economy ground to a halt. But since a person can live only
3 days without water, 3 weeks without food, after a couple of months one would
expect virtually the entire population of Gaza would be dead. One might infer
that pro-Palestianian and humanitarian sources exaggerated the civilian peril.
In February, pro-Israeli news counter-attacked with a new scandal: evidence of
United Nations relief workers who are members of Hamas and took part in the
Oct. 7 attacks. Fog of war not only
exists; but fog of competing public relations; which is to say, the struggle
between polarized perceptions of reality. The scope of this information war, as
of this writing, appears to be entering an even more extreme phase. In March, 5
months into the war, reports of deaths by famine were beginning, beyond direct
fatalities of military weapons. A news report estimated that one-quarter of
Gaza inhabitants were in famine and starvation, and another half in acute
malnutrition. Highly escalated conflict,
in the dimension of information and news, is a war of competing accusations of
atrocity. The time-dynamics of the information war, in its sixth month,
protends a turning-point.
Time-dynamics from unity
to hawks vs. doves
The pattern of rallying in response to an external attack has been
found in the outbreak of wars in the past two centuries, since aristocratic
wars were replaced by mass politics and mass armies. Analyzing public response to the 9/11/01
attacks by crashing hijacked airplanes into buildings, I found a sudden wave of
support for the President; display of flags everywhere; near-unanimity in
demands for swift military retaliation (Collins 2004). After 3 months, articles
started to ask "Is it OK to take our flags down now?" By 6 months,
flag-display had fallen by a half; Presidential popularity dropped; and the
normal partisan divide reappeared. In the following year, acrimonious debate
took place over the decision to invade Iraq. Comparing government popularity
polls and other indicators for previous wars, I concluded that the
time-dynamics of response to an atrocity jump quickly to a plateau; during the
3-to-6 months period unity erodes; and thereafter, internal debates go on
between a militant push-on-to-victory faction and a stop-the-bleeding faction.
Wars can continue for years, but after the initial months, patriotic
fervor is replaced by government regimentation. World War I showed all of these
phases in an extreme form: enthusiastic crowds demonstrated for war in the
major capitals of Europe in the summer of 1914; by winter, war had become a
grind, continued more by conscription and coercion than patriotism. Political
movements for a negotiated armistice, and even mutiny in the armies became
widespead after two years. These were put down by the continue-to-victory
factions in England, France, and Russia; this tells us that although the
hawks-vs-doves split sets in if the war doesn't end in victory within a few
months, we don't have a systematic explanation of which faction will win in
this political conflict over continuing a war. The pattern is seen also in the
Ukraine, where volunteer soldiers were enthusiastic during the early months of
fighting the Russian invasion; but by the second year, the government
aggressively conscripted men in the face of increasing evasion, as the war
turned into a high-casualty stalemate on both sides, and the President's
popularity began to fall.
For the Gaza war, internal splits appeared more quickly than 3
months. In Israel, this took the form of a movement to free the hostages by
bargaining with the enemy; at 2 months, a partial exchange was worked out for a
portion of the civilian hostages. By 4 months, the movement for hostage
exchange became more vehement, even favoring a truce, and holding protest
demonstrations demanding the resignation of the Prime Minister. The Israeli
government has remained firm on pursuing the war to total extermination of
Hamas. In much of Europe and the rest of the world, initial outrage about the
Oct. 7 raid was outweighed by the destruction of Gaza and the sufferings of its
homeless population. These responses appear correlated with the size of the
Muslim population. In the US, public sympathy was strongly on the side of
Israel; and pro-Palestinian demonstrations and statements have been excoriated.
But here too, public sympathy for the plight of Gaza residents has grown;
within two months, the US government swung around to urging Israeli military
restraint; and opposition has grown to military aid to Israel.
The surge of righteous militancy and the swing
to internal debate fits the 3-to-6-month pattern; most slowly in Israel itself,
the initial victim; more rapidly in other countries depending on the strength
of their ties to Israel or to Muslim populations. Extrapolating forward in time,
I would predict that if the Gaza war continues past 6 months, there will be a
rapid falling off of external support for Israel; in Israel itself, the war may
turn unpopular around the one-year mark. To stay in office, the Israeli
government may attempt to expand the war with its neighbours, bringing about a
more serious emergency (since the immediate threat from Hamas is low) to
justify a larger war mobilization, and to involve its hesitant foreign allies.
The debate between war-victory faction and peace faction includes
both emotional rhetoric, and reasoned calculation. Emotions are stirred by
"their sacrifice shall not be in vain!" "the victims will not be
forgotten, they must be avenged!" But also arguments that peace is secured
by strength; that to show weakness now is to invite future attacks; that the capacities
of the enemy must be utterly destroyed to make sure they do not rise up again.
Peace through strength is a reasonable argument, and has some historical
support. But it also has its limits; harsh sanctions on Germany after WWI
caused WWII; the Marshall Plan after WWII brought a lengthy peace in Europe.
Tough Israeli responses to domestic terrorism during past decades have
intensified polarization. Although it is possible that most Hamas members will
be killed, memory of sufferings in Gaza would promote equally hostile movements
in the following generation.
The peace movement position is also realistic: whatever the
righteousness of the cause, whatever the desire for justice, for revenge, for
restoring historic borders; if your war is not quickly won, to prolong it is to
increase the amount of destructiveness and human suffering. If the costs of
continuing to fight are high on both sides, the most rational things to do, as
well as the most humane, is to stop; to make a truce; to end the fighting. This
is so in a war of mutual attrition and stalemate like the Ukraine; and also in
a one-sided war like Gaza where one side suffers far greater casualties and
material destruction than the other. But even here, the costs to Israel of
becoming hated for a destruction that the defeated view as their own holocaust,
is a high price to pay.
Aren't we forgetting the terrible atrocities of October 7, now
fading in the rear-view mirror? Yes, that is what happens in the time-dynamics
of public emotions. Just as old political scandals are forgotten in the wake of
new political scandals; remembered as history but without the emotional
intensity of the lived event. Some people keep the outrage of old atrocities
alive; but they have to organize their lives around evil memories while the
rest of the world goes on with their lives. And also as new atrocities happen,
with public attention turning to the latest. This is a long-term consequence of
the emotional time-dynamics of violent conflict. From a peace movement point of
view, this kind of realism holds out at certain amount of hope. Without
emotional forgetting, old cycles of revenge would never come to an end.
References
Randall Collins. 2004. "Rituals of Soldarity and Security in
the Wake of Terrorist Attack." Sociological
Theory 22: 53-87.
Randall Collins. 2022. Explosive
Conflict: Time-Dynamics of Violence. Routledge.
Michael Mann. 2023. On Wars.
Yale University Press.