Saturday, August 24, 2024

SELF-SEGREGATING CONVERSATIONS IN PUBLIC BY GENDER, AGE, AND CLASS

Personal relationships are enacted by talking with each other. If people don't have anything to say to each other, they generally can't sustain a personal connection. We can study social relationships by observing who talks with whom and in what manner.  I will present research on differences in conversations by males or females; young or old; and different social class.

 

Women and men have distinct styles of talking; but in the upper-middle class, women talk more like men. For children, social class differences develop later: children sound more alike than adults do. People segregate themselves most sharply by age and class; as we can see when observing who is with whom in public.

 

I am going to describe an unobtrusive method I have been using to do research on conversations. It doesn't involve invading anybody's privacy, or carrying a hidden tape-recorder or camera. In the past two years, walking around city streets and parks, I carry a small note-book; and when I hear somebody talking, I write down the words, the tone of voice, and a brief description of the persons in the conversation.

 

Sometimes it is only a few words; sometimes it is several sentences. One might think that we can't make much sense out of little bits of conversation, unless we hear a complete exchange, as people talk back and forth. The fragments I pick up are mostly lacking in this kind of context. In addition, I know nothing about these people except what they look like and where they are when the bit of talking takes place. Nevertheless, I will try to show you that these little samples of talk make a sociological pattern; different kinds of people tend to do certain kinds of talking, when they are in public places. And we can infer that this is a sample of the way they talk in sociable situations elsewhere.

 

I started this research two years ago, in the latter part of the covid epidemic. During that time, many people started taking daily walks, for exercise and get out of the house. Restaurants had been set up on sidewalks, and many of these still remain. Somewhat earlier, with the proliferation of mobile phones, people became used to speaking their private conversations, generally quite loudly, in public. One might think that cell phone conversations would have even less context, since we hear and see only one side of the participants; but I will show you that cell phone talking fits the same social patterns as face-to-face talk.

 

Thus far I have collected about 240 conversational samples. I do not collect practical situations, where someone is giving an order at a restaurant, or delivering a package. I omit conversations that involve myself or where I know the people personally. I do not include conversations consisting entirely of people saying hello or other kinds of brief greetings; who greets whom shows a very strong difference by class and age, which I will summarize at the end.

 

Most of my observations were made in California, but some of these patterns exist in other parts of the world.

 

Here are two examples:

 

Two adult voices, female, walking past me on a block of neighbourhood shops. Hip-fitting jeans, slender, upper-middle-class women in their 30s.  Mezzo-soprano voice says:  "I don't want to have anything to do with it."

Alto voice: "I thought I had a thought on that..." and she ends  with a trill and a laugh.

 

Middle-age man in scruffy work clothes, a house construction worker, to  the female driver of delivery truck stopped in street:
M: "We'll have to go for a drink some time."

F: "What's that?"

M: repeats "We should go for a drink some time."

F: laughs

M: laughs

F drives off

 

The two conversations differ in social class and in gender composition. The two fashionable women are having what Goffman would call a backstage conversation, about someone they both know. They speak in a sophisticated manner, elaborate grammar and a certain amount of social distancing:  "I don't want to have anything to do with it." "I thought I had a thought on that..."  They are speaking cleverly; and seem to enjoy their cleverness, by the tone of voice and the laugh.

 

The second conversation, like the first, takes place within the same social class, in this case working class. It's a familiar sexual flirtation: the older man suggests having a drink "some time"; the woman puts him off by questioning what he has said; and laughs when he repeats it. He laughs too-- it was a failure but we had fun playing this little conversational game. She never says anything negative, but she wins anyway.

 

Here are some generalizations: by sex; by age; by social class.

 

POINT [1] WOMEN TALK ABOUT PERSONS; MEN TALK ABOUT OBJECTIVE THINGS.

 

3 teen-adolescent girls in shorts: "cause Jeremiah-- sometimes he-" --- I heard only four words, but they are talking about a person they know.

 

2 teen girls, hands in blue-jeans pockets; one says in a soft little voice:  "with him, it's like.... well, I get it..."  --- Not a complete sentence, but the pronouns are enough to know it's about a particular boy.

 

2 YF [young women in their 20s]: "He'll never do that again. But I--"

 

Older and younger women with a dog: YF: "She was really upset with her..."

 

2 dumpy mom-aged Fs: "I hope she feels really bad about it for the rest of the day."  --- angry about somebody.

 

2 middle age housewives, schlumpfy in jeans, saying goodbye to each other; the woman about to get into a car says:  "What he doesn't know won't hurt him!"-- then gives a shrill giggle.  This is Goffman backstage talk, secrets between intimates. So are the next two quotes:

 

2 middle age Fs, walking: "I could not get that answer out of him..." ---  complaining about a husband or son.

 

2 Fs, around 50: "she was worried that whatever it was..."

 

2 50s-ish women walking: "She's a comedian. She's very acerbic. She's blonde." 

 

"...then she lost momentum and she can't get back into it..." Two 50s-ish women on bay-side walking path in a very nice residential area next to a yacht harbor, chattering full speed-- as I can hear them into the distance. ---  The last couple of examples suggest higher social class by their vocabulary "acerbic," "momentum" -- psychology talk.

 

This pattern of female talk is not confined to the United States. I heard the following in a town in Germany:  street in residential area, 2 mid-age Fs: "Er hat immer Wohnung, zu Hausen..."  translation: "He always lived at home..."

 

MALES USUALLY TALK ABOUT OBJECTIVE OR TECHNICAL TOPICS:

 

"From a freeway point of view--" guy on cell phone in ocean-side park. There is no freeway in sight.

 

M to F, around 30, riding bikes in residential neighbourhood: "It's a lemon tree, or any other---" 

 

"...books that are a year old...   the books first of all..." This is a male in wide-brimmed outdoors hat and shorts, lecturing a silent female in similar clothes striding briskly past, talking a walk to stay fit. People who are together often dress alike.

 

Voices behind beautiful garden hedge, pastel-painted house in nice residential neighbourhood:  YM: "that becomes another thing--" YF: "you mean they're building units--"  YM: "yeah, residential and commercial--"

 

Even when out doing a group run, men still talk business: Bringing up the rear of 5 K run, middle-aged M walking with F says: "convenience of ownership..."

 

Even at a party, men tend to talk about objective topics rather than gossip about people. Saturday afternoon yard party behind hedge; sounds of several small children, a baby, laughing, giggling, encouraged by adults. At far end of hedge, a M in conversation says: "Well I think 100% wood... waterfront ..."

 

Men's conversation is not very sensitive to social situations. Most men dislike small talk -- i.e. talk expressly designed to fill a social obligation to keep up a semblance of sociability. Hence their talk intrudes male topics even when inappropriate:

 

Two male/female couples, middle-aged, presumably long married; in a hotel lobby bar, full of people on vacation. The women sit across from the men, who carry on a conversation: "Why are you still renting? The irony is..."  "Can we still get another year? ... on market 3 years now..." He gives a lengthy monologue in energetic voice; women sit quietly while the men talk. 

 

2 M, similarly dressed in shorts, baseball cap, T-shirt: One says: "...the agency. We don't want 'em anymore, get someone else..."

 

2 YMs  in aisle of a popular bulk-purchase store:  "Don't get me wrong, I did a 10-year at Farm" (i.e. investment in an insurance company).  They are both very fit-looking, a sign of upper-middle class status in California.

 

YM runner, loudly talking on speaker phone while getting his exercise: "I tried calling him but---"   I hear the same runner again, coming back from a dead-end street-- "a dealer I recycle with-- got him down to ... dollars a month" --- Not as high economic class as the previous example; but running for exercise is itself an indicator of social class.

 

The following example sums up the pattern of gender difference, starting already with kids:  Half-dozen children coming home from school together; one of the bigger girls in front says to another girl: "He only likes that one person..." A smaller boy at the rear talks to another boy about a dog.

 

POINT [2] DIFFERENCES BY AGE: CHILDREN AND YOUNG PEOPLE TALK ABOUT ONESELF.

 

Half dozen adolescent girls on sidewalk outside a Saturday afternoon house party:  One girl says: "I grabbed it with this hand-- I don't think I burned myself." --- One hears the first-person pronoun a lot from this demographic.

 

YF wearing tights, on cellphone: "I must be, right? I must be--" her arms  gesturing while walking.

 

A wealthy neighbourhood: YF in shorts, heavy thighs, taking on cell phone while walking a small ugly dog:  "It's like I... every supervisor turns against me... [complain-ey voice] ... Yeah, well I'm like.... I'm like..."

 

Two slender silhouettes getting larger in the on-coming distance on a residential street-- same height, same figure, casual clothes, jeans, sweater draped skirt-like around hips. One says: "I'm like this---" talking with hand gestures "[somebody's name] said I'm wrong...  I do a lot of wonderful things."

 

SAME PATTERN WHEN TALKING TO OPPOSITE SEX:

 

YF and YM with backpacks sitting under shade tree in main city park:

F: "feed the cats... I'm the only one doing anything"

 

Big-bodied YF with hands in pants pockets, with 2 YM, talking ebulliently:

"I was just craving the... and the avocados, and then you called..." --- She is pleased these boys called her to come out; and she feels responsibility to fill the time with talk, so she says whatever comes to mind, i.e. what she was just eating.

 

OLD PEOPLE TALK ABOUT THE PAST:

 

White haired woman with cane getting out of car, says to driver: "How old is he now?" "Seventy-five."  "Oh, I thought he was older."

 

Car with windows open, at stop light: woman's voice, not young: "I used to know a girl who lived there-- I recognize the shape of the hedge. She loved Elvis Presley. Isn't that a funny thing to think of?"

 

Middle-class residential street, women's voices sitting on porch : "...delivered babies for the next thirty years, and retired..."  One of the woman giggles while she talks.

 

Old M and F walking small dog; woman says: "they had nobody in the family"

 

Old M, walking dogs with mid-aged F:  "in the nineteen-twenties--"

 

2 old couples walking dogs in resort park: 2 women in back, 2 men in front,  one is saying: "... 45 years...." "... he was a really good lawyer... wanted to make him a defense attorney. He didn't like that--"

 

PARENTS AND CHILDREN

 

Mother and son walking together: boy 4 years old, says: "... wash my hands."  Mother: "It's gonna be there. It's part of nature. You know what I'm saying?" Perhaps he had an accident, shit his pants?

 

In general, parents act as advice-givers and support group to their children.

 

10-year old girl, after school, walking home with father, says: "It's not like he's not nice--"

 

Mother and daughter, both in shorts, getting out of car; mother, getting something out of trunk, says: "No I'm not-- you have so many friends--"

 

Mid-aged F walking dog, on cell phone: "so would you be able to get to any classes?"

 

M in his 60s on cell phone, in friendly voice: "Tell me-- nice job, a good job?"

 

Kids do grow up. Here are some examples of college-age young adults talking to their parents:

 

Older F and college-age daughter, who says: "the 19th century... " This is one of the rare times I've heard anyone talk in academic language, although this is a well-educated neighbourhood, as one can tell from the book-exchange boxes people have on their sidewalks.

 

College-age YM talking in front yard to older M and F. "And if there is a major discrepancy, you have to..." -- pointing his finger like delivering a lecture.

 

Now the grown-up children get to talk like adults to their parents, turning the tables.

 

POINT [3]  HIGHER CLASS TALK MORE ABOUT BUSINESS AND PROFESSIONAL MATTERS, EVEN ON SOCIAL OCCASIONS.

 

How can you tell people's social class?  One indicator is the place: a fashionable and expensive side-walk restaurant; standing outside houses that are large and luxurious, or ill-kept and decaying; at an expensive resort; or in a public park open to everybody. Sometimes clothes is a marker, even in this era of casualness when people tend to wear sports clothes everywhere. Some workers wear uniforms or overalls. In California, the upper-middle class uses fitness as a class marker: ostentatiously showing off their trim bodies.

 

UC couple: Big broad-shouldered M, wearing shorts, no shirt, very fit torso; with a woman, both ca. 60, walking with small dogs. This is a residential area, not a beach, and it is not an especially warm day.  M says: "the center where my dad goes... it's at 6000 feet.... with a pool, outdoors" --both talking loudly, assertively, about family property.

 

Fit-looking M walking dog, arrogant body-language, talking loudly into his cell phone: "these are the orals, 3 pills a day"  --- presumably a doctor.

 

Men often talk about business, even when exercizing: 2 men on sport bikes, looking alike in helmets, fashionable grizzled beards: "projecting it's gonna get worse, in January, you know, the economy has its..."

 

M on balcony over beach-side walkway, area of expensive vacation rental cottages; wearing black sweat suit, talking loudly on cell phone:  "I don't think we can negotiate with them..."

 

White haired M in shorts on cell phone says: "I don't think we have any such issue..."  in authoritative voice.

 

Sometimes the talk itself indicates social class: 2 older men strolling with dachshund: "management... that are deemed to be the owners"

 

Group of 8 middle-age M, semi-formally dressed (long-sleeved shirts, jackets, no neckties) : one man is saying:  "problem in this one... all that legalistic stuff". Such a large group walking together suggests they have come out of a meeting; this is a district of office buildings.

 

Even on vacation, men tend to intrude their topics. On the walkway in expensive resort: couple in vacation clothes; middle-aged M says to woman: "the insurance says..."  It's a beautiful tropical garden of lagoons and exotic birds, but that's not what he's thinking of.

 

WOMEN TALK BUSINESS TOO, IF THEY'RE IN THE UPPER-MIDDLE CLASS

 

Outdoor table at a trendy expensive restaurant: heavy older F, 2 nondescript YFs in their 20s, one of whom says: "Asked them about full disclosure... because of the job."

 

"Obviously I'd love to go back. The government confirms..."  This is a young woman in shorts, showoff legs, deep assertive voice; talking to  casually dressed YM and YF, in the front yard of very expensive block of   houses. 

 

Outside resort hotel in sea-side park, 2 women in their 30s, professionally dressed, wearing name-badges from a meeting: one of them says:  "manage to kill their spirit..."   --- the psychology-talk of management professionals.

 

Professionally dressed, white-haired woman sitting in an arcade outside art museum, to 4 well-dressed women at table. She is saying: "for operating expenses... so if you designate a gift"  -- smoothly explaining with her hands.

 

Mid-aged F walking dog, talking on cell phone in a UMC residential area: "I could come back down a little bit, and then sell Norris on the... "

 

Dumpy-looking  woman in her 50s to scruffy-bearded man while their dog is pissing by the sidewalk: "Because it was his own fault because he was on the committee-- he was probably good at it."

--- I'm not sure about social class in this one. They're not showing any UMC markers. Seemingly they are talking about politics, which is more common in the higher classes. The women talks critically about a particular person, which fits the gender pattern.

 

POINT [4]  CHILDREN AND EARLY TEENS RESEMBLE THEIR AGE GROUP, EVEN ACROSS SOCIAL CLASS.

 

Children of the wealthy sound like the youth culture in general. Do they eventually grow out of it and sound like the upper class?

 

Example: The neighbourhood's grand mansion, Italianate ballrooms, terraces, walled grounds; a quarter of the parterre is taken up by massive plastic playground equipment, objects that seem to speak for the wealthy parents proclaiming I-can-afford-for-my-kids-to-have-everything:  from whence comes loud shrieking of a small child, harsh, pained, persistant. All I can see across the wall is a bigger kid, maybe 5 years old, waving a tennis racket-- is he pestering and torturing a sibling, or trying to calm it down? The child's screeching persists down the block, echoing past the mansion and its hundred-meters of garden.

 

Another house in the same neighbourhood: I hear raucous shouts, jeers, exultings-- boys playing some kind of ball game behind long private hedge of another not quite-so-big mansion. Children of the rich sound no better than anyone else's kids

 

Around the block, substantial houses opposite a classic Spanish mansion surrounding a courtyard: I hear brash, piercing voices of teenage boys at the age of obnoxiousness; the loud abrasive off-key sounds of  adolescence when their voices crack. One of them comes down the street to a parked car: he is older than I thought, good-looking young man, athletic fraternity-boy type. Their looks don't match up with the way they sound.

 

On the same street: male teen voice, bare legs and feet sticking out a rolled-down car window parked in front of home: "just-- so-- fucked-- UHP..."

 

I've heard other teen boys talk like this, a string of obscenities. What seems to be new is that some of the girls and young women are adopting their language.

 

An Asian YF  talking loudly with a YM, ostentatiously waving her hands: "... and no one gave a fuck..." She is not good looking, which suggests it may be a form of rebellion against the pretty-girl standard.

 

A family group: white-bearded hispanic M, wearing pro athletic team jersey, pushing baby stroller in river walk park, an area near lower-middle class apartments. Heavy YF takes 2-year-old out of stroller to walk, holding its hand, while talking on cell phone: "Fuck you! Fuck you!" she exclaims.

 

People used to say, watch your language around children. What we see now is cell phone etiquette, or lack of etiquette, which makes people physically present invisible to the person on the mobile phone, even one's own baby.

 

I will add two more observations relevant to whether the deliberate obnoxiousness of teen-age boys is affecting gender culture. In young M/F groups, boys are often silent while girls make conversation:

3 young-teen girls in shorts: one says coyly "... asked about school, asked about Halloween..." [describing a conversation she had with an adult, probably a visiting relative] The girls are preceded on the path by 2 young-teen boys, skinny, T-shirted, silent.

 

This reminds me of observing a group of adolescent boys after school in the same neighbourhood: 3 young-teen boys, all dressed in droopy black garments, covered with cheap metal chains; all with up-spiked mops of  scraggly hair, not talking among themselves.

 

A comment about physical attractiveness: As noted, there is a cult of bodily fitness, ostentatiously presenting oneself as good-looking. Many teenage boys, especially in the awkward young teens, adopt a culture of ostentatious ugliness-- perhaps a rebellion against stratification by good looks. This can also be class conflict, as in the punk movement of thirty years ago.

 

There is a three-way intersection of age, class, and gender. From my earlier examples, it appears that men of the higher classes tend to control conversations with women of their class. Is this something boys grow into: starting as obstreperous kids, passing through a silent period, passing through obnoxious adolescence,  and ending up as assertive adults? While lower in the class structure, girls start out talking among themselves, and eventually when they grow up, take the lead over their boyfriends and husbands, at least conversationally? More evidence will tell.

 

SELF-SEGREGATION IN PUBLIC

 

My last point is more general: there is a strong tendency for people to self-segregate in little sociable groups, at least when we observe them in public. My evidence here goes beyond the conversational samples I have reported.

 

Here is another set of observations made on the streets, since the beginning of the covid epidemic: Polite greetings among strangers are largely confined to the same social class and age. Greetings take place among similar demographics-- just saying "hi," "hello," "good morning". Middle and upper-middle class people frequently exchange a brief greeting or at least a nod or a smile when out for a walk, in their own neighbourhood. Greetings are especially likely among older persons; and extend fairly widely to adults from age 30 upwards. People who are walking dogs are especially likely to greet one another, and even stop to have a conversation (usually about their dogs). On the other hand, people who are on cell phones do not greet passers-by, or hardly ever nod or smile-- the cell phone realm takes priority, even when they are not talking business but only chatting.

 

Young adults are much less likely to greet older people; they don't greet each other very much unless they are previously acquainted. Teenagers and children are encapsulated in worlds of their own.

 

Social class is an unconscious default setting for conversational boundaries. Residents who are otherwise quite polite do not exchange greetings, nods or waves with gardeners, construction and repair workers, or delivery drivers. In my observations, workers do not greet or converse with other workers unless they are on the same job.  This is one reason I have relatively few observations of WC talk; middle- and upper-class people dominate the conversational landscape, at least in public.

 

Another self-encapsulated group are people engaged in athletic activity. Bikers rarely exchange greetings or gestures with pedestrians; or with other bikers unless they are riding together, in which case they often carry on a male-style conversation. I have observed that bikers never stop for stop signs or red lights at street intersections, unless there is heavy vehicle traffic; bikers act like they are in a cocoon where ordinary laws do not apply.

 

Runners are in another cocoon; they seldom have greetings or gestures for other runners, except when it is a traffic matter like calling out "passing on your right." Runners, bikers, and pedestrians occupy the same space in parks and beaches, but are in different worlds. They almost never acknowledge each other sociably, beyond a minimal concern for avoiding collisions.

 

Has the world gotten more encapsulated as it has become self-segregated into implicit categories like street athletes, exercise walkers, and workers in public places? (not to mention cell phone users mesmerized by their screens) I hesitate to make this conclusion, since literary and historical descriptions of people in public from the 1930s on back into previous centuries show a very restricted etiquette among the status-conscious upper classes. Blatant display of rank has greatly diminished in the period after 1960; with the rise of casual clothing, preference for sports attire, and the general veneer of egalitarianism and moral disavowal of any kind of group prejudice. Nevertheless, as an observational sociologist it would be blind not to point out the ways in which people segregate themselves in public.

 

Having collected observations in public for about 30 years, and collected photos going back to about 1900, I would make the generalization:  people who are "with" someone else in public, especially in small, self-chosen groups, tend to resemble each other in almost every dimension: about the same age; similar height, weight and physique; similar degree of attractiveness; generally wearing similar clothing styles, similar degrees of formality or casualness; often the same hair styles (specially for women and for teenage boys). From these markers, we can infer they are generally of the same social class, and same subgroups within it. People who are together in public are generally of the same ethnic group or race, although this form of segregation has declined somewhat in the last 20 years. Ethnic segregation has probably declined more in work places (where integration has been mandated) than in personal life.

 

The main dimension in which people are not self-segregated in public is gender. Males and females are frequently together as couples-- at least this is true for adults; not for children. Males and females who are together tend to dress quite similarly, sometimes just in general style and degree of formality or informality, but often quite literally in this era when males and females wear the same sports or hiking clothes. Two explanations are: they select each other by their appearance; or they choose a similar self-presentation when they go out together.  Adult males tend to be taller than females of their age, but even that difference is calibrated; taller men are with taller women, etc.

 

Judging from historical photos of people in public, personal segregation has declined most for gender, with much less decline in associational segregation by economic rank. Men and women are more integrated informally than ever before; although from the conversational observations I have given, there are still major differences in male and female talk. The main place in which this difference has been overcome is in the higher social classes, where women talk more in the male style.  I have also touched on the point that there is a teenage style (especially for adolescents) where teen-culture outweighs class differences. Among young-adults, some young women are assimilating to the obscenity-laden male style-- perhaps class rebellion, perhaps age rebellion; perhaps it is just a standard of "being cool". Whether they grow out of this into adult cultural styles, as I said, remains unknown.

 

The strongest form of self-segregation in public is age segregation. People in public are almost entirely segregated by age, unless they are with their families. But even in families, look at what happens if it's a big group:

 

In a restaurant serving Mexican food, not very expensive, a multi-generation family is sitting at a long table, 9 chairs on each side. At one end of the table are two bearded grizzled men; next to them are two oldish women. Almost without exception, the females sit on one side of the table, the men on the other; arranged from older to younger, the male/female couples generally sitting across from each other. At the far end of the table are the children, arranged from teenagers down to small kids. It is one big extended family group; but they choose to sit with those nearest in age, and for the males next to males; females next to females. Presumably they sit near somebody that they can most easily have a conversation with.  Conversations across age groups are awkward, or at any rate one-sided.

 

Sampling conversation is a way to get at the mechanisms by which people choose whom they can converse with best; and thereby self-segregate themselves.

 

I will conclude on a practical note about doing research. You can do sociology anywhere; all you need is a willingness to look for patterns. There is no need for an elaborate methodology. Statistics tends to dominate the social sciences; but in the history of sociology and anthropology, ethnographers have made more important discoveries than statisticians, who are locked into a narrow set of categories when they collect and analyze their data. 

 

Careful observation gives better data than any other kind of data; what we see people do and what they talk about in natural situations is far more accurate than what they say in a formal interview. This is even more true today when interviews are done by telephone or on-line rather than in person.

 

If we ask people about how segregated they are personally by race or any other category, we will get a biased answer towards the ideal response. Surveys would not have discovered the extent of self-segregation by age or by good looks (although it has been discovered that obese people tend to be friends with each other). That is because statisticians use existing categories, and can only add new categories when someone else finds them. Journalists are even worse, generating headlines out of two-variable statistics, ignoring complexities and what happens on the ground.

 

Ethnographers may not have the prestige in the academic world that goes to people who get big research grants or use elaborate computer schemes. We're relatively cheap researchers. But we're also higher quality. Even if we are a sociological underground, we're the ones who keep sociology going intellectually. And I venture to say, we're the ones who have more fun. Join us!

 

Appendix: the screeching cult among pre-school children

 

In the last 10 years I have noticed that small children in public places often produce a high-pitched screeching or shrieking sound. It is piercing, since children make it as loud as possible and in the audible range where sound carries farthest. It is deliberately produced rather than a spontaneous cry of discomfort or distress; as we can tell because the child looks happy, even proud; and because it is a long sustained sound, not the choking, sobbing rhythm of genuine crying.

 

Here are some examples: [we have already seen one with the child in the mansion's private playground]

 

A harbor and park area full of tourists from many countries. Two little girls, each in a stroller pushed by a parent, lean out sideways to look at each other and scream loudly, smiling, having fun doing it.

 

Two girls, age about 4 and 5, playing on a small merry-go-round near an apartment house. The older girl shrieks with delight as she pushes the younger girl. Each burst lasts for a few seconds, repeating intermittently as they play.

 

A crowded outdoor seafood market. A 2-year old girl in stroller pushed by father shrieks piercingly.

 

Downtown shopping street in popular tourist city. African man carrying a boy (about 4 years old) in his arms. Boy is screaming at the top of his lungs, stopping only to catch his breath. Father puts him down to try to distract him, but unsuccessfully. Picks him up again, still screaming, and they disappear around a corner.

 

South Asian family waiting for their order in a fast-food restaurant: father, mother, grandmother in Hindu-garbed sari; two older girls (around 6 to 9) running around. Two-year-old boy in stroller, clapping his hands loudly:

CRACK! CRACK! CRACK! repeatedly, looking around with a determined expression on his face. He has found a substitute for shrieking, but with similar circumstances and effect. Father looks embarassed; grandmother smiles indulgently.

 

Some examples may overlap with children crying from exhaustion or boredom during extended time in public accompanying parents, a combination of sounds and motives. I have noticed pure shrieking especially in airport terminals, but also on streets and playgrounds, in North America, Europe, and East Asia.

 

Why do children screech? We should avoid imposing our adult opinions; instead, look at the visible evidence. Two patterns: Children do it for fun, judging from facial expressions and body postures; and in the presence of other children of similar size.

 

Children screech when they are with their parents, especially in public, less so at home; and not when they are alone. This implies they are taking advantage of permissive, non-disciplinary parents, in crowded public places.

 

Sociologist John Parker, who has a 5-year-old son, agrees that the shrieking is deliberate. He interprets it as a weapon of the weak, for children of an age without many resources for power over others.

 

We can pin it down by age and situation. Deliberate shrieking does not seem prominent among babies and toddlers; nor among school-age children, where they are regimented (also in games) by adults keeping order. Screeching thus concentrates in age 2-5, when kids go to day-care or make the acquaintance of a peer-group of other kids.

 

Where do they learn to makes these sounds? Not from adults. Not from TV or the electronic media. The content of 21st century child entertainment is innocuous, compared to the comic violence in 20th century cartoons like Road-runner or Bugs Bunny. Shrieking is concentrated in the ages when children play with each other and are not yet fully absorbed in computer games. They must learn shrieking from each other-- from hearing each other shriek in public.

 

It is a genuine culture, autonomous of the adult world and its entertainment designed for kids. Remarkably, the shrieking/screeching culture has spread around much of the world, passed along among small children by themselves.

 

This theory is testable. Where do we expect not  to find the screeching culture? In parts of the world or parts of societies where:

[a] parents are authoritarian and exercise strict controls or punishment;

[b] families are not part of the cosmopolitan circuit of middle-class tourist sites and travel places (such as airports).

 

What theory could possibly have predicted the rise of a global shrieking-children culture?  That is why we need ethnographers to keep their eyes and ears open for what is happening.

 

Wednesday, June 5, 2024

BIRTH RATE DECLINE IS THE SOLUTION TO GLOBAL WARMING

 

The underlying cause of global warming is population growth.

 

Total human population of the earth went from about 600 million people in the year 1700 to about 1.2 billion in 1850, as the industrial revolution took off. The curve accelerated, reaching 2.5 billion in 1950. Since then, industrialization spread from the Europeanized West to East Asia and elsewhere; reaching 6 billion in 1999, and 8 billion in 2022.

 

The acceleration in global warming is closely related to the trajectory of population growth since 1950. All the well-known human causes of warming in the atmosphere and the ocean are by-products of many more people on the earth: air pollution from automobiles, aircraft and fossil-fuel energy; cutting down forests and paving over green areas for buildings and transportation; expansion of agriculture producing methane gases. As world population continues to expand to a projected 9 or 10 billion in the next half-century, these processes can realistically be expected to continue to drive up global temperature.

 

The ultimate solution to global warming is to reverse the population explosion. This does not mean just stopping world population from growing further. Projections vary, but all of them are huge numbers: 6, 8, or 10 billion people still put tremendous pressure on the ecology. They will continue to generate a high global temperature, compared to the comparatively cool temperature of 1950 when the population was a third of today's.  

 

Reversing population growth is difficult to do by direct government policy. Coercive population controls are regarded by many people as unethical. Instead, there has emerged a spontaneous trend towards the reduction of population: below-replacement fertility rates. 

 

Fertility rates per woman were high during the long historic era of high infant mortality; and in most industrialized countries with scientific health measures birth rates eventually fell to around the replacement level of approximately 2.1 per woman. But anything above replacement level would not bring down the total population. The new trend, visible since about 2000 in many parts of the industrialized world, below-replacement birth rates, does have the potential not just to stabilize the growth of world population, but to reduce it. The underlying cause of global warming, if this trend continues, will be reversed.

 

Fertility rates are now about 1.6 in the USA, northern and western Europe; 1.3 in Italy and southern Europe, and in Japan. South Korea is down to 0.8; China to 1.2-- even after abolition of the one-child policy, people have become accustomed to having a very small family.

 

Most of the Western Hemisphere, Europe, and East Asia are below replacement level. The high growth areas that remain are Africa at 4.2, and the Islamic world generally.

 

News on below-replacement birth rates is usually viewed with alarm by economists and politicians. A steady flow of cohorts of new adults spurs spending, especially in the family-formation life phase. An aging population spends less. And any decline in sales tends to have negative ripple-effects. The capitalist business model is based on expectations of growth; even falling short of projected growth tends to drive down investment and stock values. An extended period of below-replacement birth rates foreshadows economic contraction.

 

Governments around the world have been offering incentives for women to have more children; but these have had little effect. (Japan and Hungary are two examples.) Having children is not just an economic decision; it is a life-style choice; and it is affected by cultural changes and career patterns that governments have little power to control.

 

Economic contraction may be the price to be paid for stopping global warming. Disastrous effects of rising ocean levels * cannot be stopped merely by keeping global temperature at its current level; it would require reversing global warming. If the below-replacement birth rate pattern continues to exist, in the wealthier parts of the world; and spreads elsewhere -- just as most other customs have spread -- we may see a world population decline within the next 50 years. An increasingly aging population in this respect would be less damaging to the world ecology; because old people do not consume as much in new products and energy use.

 

* "... the global mean sea level will rise up to 10 feet over the next 2,000 years [i.e. out to the year 4020], if warming is limited to 1.5 degrees Celsius. With a 2-degree Celsius increase, seas could rise up to 20 feet... according to the World Meteorological Organization."  Associated Press, Feb. 15, 2023.

 

Economists and politicians can hardly be expected to be happy about falling birth rates as a solution to global warming. But thus far, most other fixes have not had much effect. Below-replacement birth rates are a spontaneous human reaction to life under present social conditions. Whether ultra-low birth rates will continue to trend downwards is an open question. We may regard this as a choice of evils. But since population growth has been the most important driver of global warming, we should welcome a reversal of this trend, whatever its economic effects.

 

The falling fertility rates of the last few decdes are a gift to world ecology. It is almost as if, after 70 years of population boom and global warming, the human part of our ecology has spontaneously evolved a solution. Not immediately, since everything in the process of evolution takes time. But on the horizon of the foreseeable future, the world will survive and perhaps prosper.

Sunday, March 31, 2024

SOCIOLOGY OF THE GAZA WAR

 What can a sociologist say that hasn't been said many times about the Hamas raid and Israel's retaliatory war in Gaza?  I will draw on theoretical generalizations from the history and time-dynamics of violence (Mann 2023; Collins 2022); as applied to a daily chronology of news sources from Oct. 7, 2023 onwards. I will make 3 points.

 

[1] Hamas's violent incursion, killing and raping civilians and taking hostages, is a reversion to ancient and medieval forms of war. It is a conscious rejection of modern laws and norms. It is also a tactic to compensate for Israel's overwhelming advantage in state capacity and military power.

 

[2] The sequence of events fits the pattern of polarization found in all large-scale conflicts: emotions and beliefs go to extremes. All virtues are on our side; all evil qualities are on the other.  Each side sees the other as the epitome of evil, and themselves as innocent victims. This moral gulf justifies both sides in carrying out extreme acts against the other.

 

[3]  Time-dynamics are patterns in the intensity of mobilization over a period of time. When a large-scale conflict breaks out, excitement spreads very rapidly in the first few days. Expressions of emotional and moral polarization are at their peak in the first weeks. Mobilization stays at a plateau for about 3 months; by 6 months part of the group loses their militancy, and begins to seek a truce or end the conflict; while another faction presses on for their righteous drive to victory. To conflict with the enemy is added conflict between "hawks" and "doves". This time pattern was studied in the period followed the 9/11/01 attacks, and with historical data on public behavior and opinion after the outbreaks of war, from World War One through the recent past (Collins 2004; 2022).  Time-dynamics  enables us to predict in some degree what will happen in the future.

 

Deliberate revival of pre-modern cultural traditions of violence  

 

Raiding was the predominant style of war in tribal societies-- i.e. temporary coalitions of warriors; in contrast to state-organized societies with a permanent government and professional armies. A raid does not attempt to take enemy territory but just temporarily cause havoc in it. Tribal coalitions had an informal leader-and-follower pattern on the battlefield. War between adjacent tribes usually took the form of loose battle lines, with individuals darting forward to shoot arrows or spears and then running back. Such confrontations were usually indecisive. Most casualties were caused by raiding the other's territory, especially by stealth, and killing any isolated victim-- a child or woman from the enemy tribe was considered a victory and was celebrated.

 

A more sophisticated version of raiding was capturing enemy warriors; sometimes taken as slaves. The Aztecs of central Mexico fought to capture warriors to sacrifice on their ceremonial pyramid; this served both as an impressive religious ritual, and to terrify neighbouring tribes into submission.  Tribes with herding animals raided to capture the cattle or horses of their enemies. When European settlers spread across the Americas, hostilities were often triggered by native tribes raiding their livestock, leading to the whites retaliating with modern fire-power.

 

Medieval armies, whether fighting within Europe, or in the Crusades to Palestine and Syria, were typically bands of mounted knights. In the shifting stalemates that often ensued, they would concentrate on capturing hostages, who could then be traded either for ransom or in a prisoner exchange. When armies of the Roman phalanx type encountered tribal armies in North Africa, the latter used the tactic of a noisy attack, then suddenly running away, setting up an ambush as their pursuers became strung out and lost their formation. Middle Eastern armies had an historical tradition of hit-and-run raids. The Arab army mustered by T.E. Lawrence in World War One raided Ottoman railroad lines, combining camels for mobility with modern explosives. There was a long tradition of taking captives, either as slaves (the Mameluke army of Egypt was itself recruited from boys captured  as slaves), or as hostages for exchange. Arabs were the principal slave traders, intermediaries between sub-Saharan Africa and slave markets elsewhere.

 

With the development of modern customs and laws of war in Europe, such practices were gradually stigmatized and outlawed. Hostage taking became kidnapping-- one of the capital offenses along with murder. Capturing for ransom has become heinous, as is trafficking sex-slaves. Distinctions became drawn between civilians and military; deliberate violence against civilians becomes a major crime akin to genocide. 

 

The Hamas raid into Israel was designed to capture hostages to trade for the release of Hamas prisoners held in Israel. One could call it a deliberate atavism; but it is also hyper-modern in the sense that it is a calculation as to what tactics would work against a militarily dominant state. Israel had proven itself unmoved by modern tactics of mass demonstrations, terrorist bombings, and guerilla war; reacting by bulldozing family homes of terrorists and destroying hiding places among the civilian population. But experience in recent years showed the Israelis were willing to release a large number of prisoners in exchange for a few or even one hostage. Hostage taking was one tactic that worked.

 

It also fits with the moral stance of militant Muslim groups. Western society is represented in cartoons and propaganda as immoral and decadent; its sex life as pornographic; its women as dissolute, compared to the purity ideal of covered-up Muslim women. The biggest target of the October 7 raid was an all-night drug concert, Western-style music with ecstasy and psychedelics, held in the desert near the Gaza border. It was simultaneously an easy target -- a bunch of stoned druggies-- and a display of what conservative Muslim culture considered disgraceful. The concert was the site of numerous rapes, stripping women naked, killing them or taking them prisoner. Intercepted messages of excited congratulation from the families of the rapists show the righteous attitude of the traditionalists; comparable to Biblical rejoicing in the destruction of Sodom and Gomorrah. This is not just anti-modernism; it is moral condemnation of modernity.

 

We may add one more point on tactics. Throughout the spring and summer of 2023, a political crisis built up in Israel, concerning the power of the Supreme Court to over-rule decisions made by the legislature. With a coalition of conservatives holding a narrow majority, liberal parties mobilized impassioned demonstrations, in an atmosphere widely regarded as a constitutional crisis. Large segments of the Israeli military joined the opposition; there was wild talk of civil war. Hamas leaders, close observers of their enemy, saw an ideal opportunity for their hostage-taking raid. Political controversy in Israel following October 7 has faulted the government for failure of vigilance. But a sociological explanation of the intelligence failure must include the distraction of attention, including within the armed forces and intelligence agencies, when the focus was on the constitutional crisis.

 

Religious and other forms of traditional moralities and practices can coexist with strategic caculations. Technologies of war have always been the quickest to diffuse to traditional societies. There is no anomaly in Hamas using drones, gliders and bulldozers to mount a tribalistic raid aimed at civilians of all ages and sexes, practicing both ritual humiliation and strategic hostage-taking. The combination of modern rationality and anti-modern traditionalism is no sociological contradiction.

 

Polarization of righteous outrage on both sides

 

The October 7 raid was viewed with shock and outrage not only in Israel-- where the Supreme Court crisis was quickly dropped and an all-parties war cabinet formed-- but world-wide. On the other side, sympathy for Palestinian grievances has grown since the Intifada protests in the 1990s, which although a failure in Israel, attracted attention of the outside world. Sympathy existed not only in the Muslim world, but in Europe and among left-wing and immigrant groups. In the USA, which contains the largest Jewish population outside Israel, politicians and journalists reacted vehemently to pro-Palestianian statements and demonstrations, accusing liberal university administrators of shielding anti-semitism. Although the media were largely on the Israeli side, public ambivalence increased when Israel  invaded Gaza, with devastating use of modern air power, causing outrage among Palestinian sympathizers and qualms among neutrals.

 

The war quickly became a contest of rival public relations campaigns. Israel at first attempted to keep the focus on the victims of the raid, especially civilian atrocities upon children and women (with less attention to the number of Israeli soldiers also taken captive). Over time this was upstaged by news coming out of Gaza, a mounting toll of deaths, estimated at comprising two-thirds women and children. Israel attempted to keep control over news sources, allowing only selected reporters to cover the scenes it wanted to publicize, notably the underground tunnels; soft-spoken military spokespersons explained on television that Israel's response was moderate, precision-planned, doing everything possible to protect Palestianian civilians. Meanwhile, photos from Gaza showed buildings flattened like the worst of WWII, and on television people digging bodies out of the rubble with their bare hands. As Israeli forces moved southward, virtually the entire population was forced to crowd into a shrinking space. Israeli warnings to evacuate came across as propaganda, giving little practical opportunity to escape, and nowhere safe from aerial attacks.

 

Although perhaps sincerely meant by some Israeli officials, precautions to protect civilians were advisory only and could be overruled by military contingencies. The concept of "precision weapons" is itself euphemistic; the fog of war still exists, even with advanced electronics and surveillance. An instance is the scandal when several hostages escaping in the war zone were killed by Israeli troops, who thought they were a Hamas ruse for an ambush; even when the hostages called out in Hebrew, some of the soldiers did not hear the order to hold fire, in the noise of combat. Unintended strikes on civilians continue to happen in high-tech war, especially when it consists of long distance air strikes plus dispersed infantry operations in the maze of urban warfare. And some strikes are intended, willing to inflict civilian casualties if they provide cover for militant hide-outs. Although numbers are always suspect under these conditions, the 1200 Israelis killed in the Oct. 7 raid have been steadily drowned out in the rising level of Palestian casualties, surpassing 30,000 at time of writing. To counter this perception, Israeli public relations periodically released more graphic depictions of the original Oct. 7 atrocities and the experiences of hostages released in prisoner trades.

 

Since late October 2023, Palestianians and international aid organizations have described a desperate situation throughout Gaza-- running out of water, sanitation, medical supplies, and food. By all appearances the situation was dire-- almost everyone's home destroyed, the economy ground to a halt. But since a person can live only 3 days without water, 3 weeks without food, after a couple of months one would expect virtually the entire population of Gaza would be dead. One might infer that pro-Palestianian and humanitarian sources exaggerated the civilian peril. In February, pro-Israeli news counter-attacked with a new scandal: evidence of United Nations relief workers who are members of Hamas and took part in the Oct. 7 attacks.  Fog of war not only exists; but fog of competing public relations; which is to say, the struggle between polarized perceptions of reality. The scope of this information war, as of this writing, appears to be entering an even more extreme phase. In March, 5 months into the war, reports of deaths by famine were beginning, beyond direct fatalities of military weapons. A news report estimated that one-quarter of Gaza inhabitants were in famine and starvation, and another half in acute malnutrition.  Highly escalated conflict, in the dimension of information and news, is a war of competing accusations of atrocity. The time-dynamics of the information war, in its sixth month, protends a turning-point.

 

Time-dynamics from unity to hawks vs. doves

 

The pattern of rallying in response to an external attack has been found in the outbreak of wars in the past two centuries, since aristocratic wars were replaced by mass politics and mass armies.  Analyzing public response to the 9/11/01 attacks by crashing hijacked airplanes into buildings, I found a sudden wave of support for the President; display of flags everywhere; near-unanimity in demands for swift military retaliation (Collins 2004). After 3 months, articles started to ask "Is it OK to take our flags down now?" By 6 months, flag-display had fallen by a half; Presidential popularity dropped; and the normal partisan divide reappeared. In the following year, acrimonious debate took place over the decision to invade Iraq. Comparing government popularity polls and other indicators for previous wars, I concluded that the time-dynamics of response to an atrocity jump quickly to a plateau; during the 3-to-6 months period unity erodes; and thereafter, internal debates go on between a militant push-on-to-victory faction and a stop-the-bleeding faction.

 

Wars can continue for years, but after the initial months, patriotic fervor is replaced by government regimentation. World War I showed all of these phases in an extreme form: enthusiastic crowds demonstrated for war in the major capitals of Europe in the summer of 1914; by winter, war had become a grind, continued more by conscription and coercion than patriotism. Political movements for a negotiated armistice, and even mutiny in the armies became widespead after two years. These were put down by the continue-to-victory factions in England, France, and Russia; this tells us that although the hawks-vs-doves split sets in if the war doesn't end in victory within a few months, we don't have a systematic explanation of which faction will win in this political conflict over continuing a war. The pattern is seen also in the Ukraine, where volunteer soldiers were enthusiastic during the early months of fighting the Russian invasion; but by the second year, the government aggressively conscripted men in the face of increasing evasion, as the war turned into a high-casualty stalemate on both sides, and the President's popularity began to fall.

 

For the Gaza war, internal splits appeared more quickly than 3 months. In Israel, this took the form of a movement to free the hostages by bargaining with the enemy; at 2 months, a partial exchange was worked out for a portion of the civilian hostages. By 4 months, the movement for hostage exchange became more vehement, even favoring a truce, and holding protest demonstrations demanding the resignation of the Prime Minister. The Israeli government has remained firm on pursuing the war to total extermination of Hamas. In much of Europe and the rest of the world, initial outrage about the Oct. 7 raid was outweighed by the destruction of Gaza and the sufferings of its homeless population. These responses appear correlated with the size of the Muslim population. In the US, public sympathy was strongly on the side of Israel; and pro-Palestinian demonstrations and statements have been excoriated. But here too, public sympathy for the plight of Gaza residents has grown; within two months, the US government swung around to urging Israeli military restraint; and opposition has grown to military aid to Israel. 

 

 The surge of righteous militancy and the swing to internal debate fits the 3-to-6-month pattern; most slowly in Israel itself, the initial victim; more rapidly in other countries depending on the strength of their ties to Israel or to Muslim populations. Extrapolating forward in time, I would predict that if the Gaza war continues past 6 months, there will be a rapid falling off of external support for Israel; in Israel itself, the war may turn unpopular around the one-year mark. To stay in office, the Israeli government may attempt to expand the war with its neighbours, bringing about a more serious emergency (since the immediate threat from Hamas is low) to justify a larger war mobilization, and to involve its hesitant foreign allies.

 

The debate between war-victory faction and peace faction includes both emotional rhetoric, and reasoned calculation. Emotions are stirred by "their sacrifice shall not be in vain!" "the victims will not be forgotten, they must be avenged!" But also arguments that peace is secured by strength; that to show weakness now is to invite future attacks; that the capacities of the enemy must be utterly destroyed to make sure they do not rise up again. Peace through strength is a reasonable argument, and has some historical support. But it also has its limits; harsh sanctions on Germany after WWI caused WWII; the Marshall Plan after WWII brought a lengthy peace in Europe. Tough Israeli responses to domestic terrorism during past decades have intensified polarization. Although it is possible that most Hamas members will be killed, memory of sufferings in Gaza would promote equally hostile movements in the following generation.

 

The peace movement position is also realistic: whatever the righteousness of the cause, whatever the desire for justice, for revenge, for restoring historic borders; if your war is not quickly won, to prolong it is to increase the amount of destructiveness and human suffering. If the costs of continuing to fight are high on both sides, the most rational things to do, as well as the most humane, is to stop; to make a truce; to end the fighting. This is so in a war of mutual attrition and stalemate like the Ukraine; and also in a one-sided war like Gaza where one side suffers far greater casualties and material destruction than the other. But even here, the costs to Israel of becoming hated for a destruction that the defeated view as their own holocaust, is a high price to pay.

 

Aren't we forgetting the terrible atrocities of October 7, now fading in the rear-view mirror? Yes, that is what happens in the time-dynamics of public emotions. Just as old political scandals are forgotten in the wake of new political scandals; remembered as history but without the emotional intensity of the lived event. Some people keep the outrage of old atrocities alive; but they have to organize their lives around evil memories while the rest of the world goes on with their lives. And also as new atrocities happen, with public attention turning to the latest. This is a long-term consequence of the emotional time-dynamics of violent conflict. From a peace movement point of view, this kind of realism holds out at certain amount of hope. Without emotional forgetting, old cycles of revenge would never come to an end.

 

References

 

Randall Collins. 2004. "Rituals of Soldarity and Security in the Wake of Terrorist Attack." Sociological Theory  22: 53-87.

 

Randall Collins. 2022. Explosive Conflict: Time-Dynamics of Violence. Routledge.

 

Michael Mann. 2023. On Wars. Yale University Press.